

# Efficiently Protecting Data and Functions



Thomas Schneider

CROSSING Summer School  
September 13, 2019



# Based on joint works with...



Ágnes  
Kiss



Daniel  
Demmler




Daniel  
Günther

... and many more.

- 1. Secure Function Evaluation with Mixed Protocols**
- 2. Private Function Evaluation of Boolean Circuits**


- 1. Secure Function Evaluation with Mixed Protocols**
2. Private Function Evaluation of Boolean Circuits

# Secure Function Evaluation (SFE)



# Secure Function Evaluation (SFE)

- compute arbitrary function  $f$
- on private data  $x, y$
- **without trusted third party**
- reveal nothing but result  $z = f(x, y)$



**Example: Yao's Millionaires' Problem**



Auctions [NPS99], ...



Your PC ran into a problem that it couldn't handle, and now it needs to restart.

You can search for the error online: HAL\_INITIALIZATION\_FAILED

Remote Diagnostics [BPSW07], ...



DNA Searching [TKC07], ...




Biometric Identification [EFGKLT09], ...



Medical Diagnostics [BFKLSS09], ...

# Implementing Secure Function Evaluation






# Example for Mixed-Protocol SFE: Minimum Euclidean Distance

Minimum Euclidean Distance:  $\min(\sum_{i=1}^d (S_{i,1} - C_i)^2, \dots, \sum_{i=1}^d (S_{i,n} - C_i)^2)$


- Server holds database  $S$ , client holds query  $C$
- Used in biometric matching (face-recognition, fingerprint, ...)



# Example for Mixed-Protocol SFE: Minimum Euclidean Distance

Minimum Euclidean Distance:  $\min(\sum_{i=1}^d (S_{i,1} - C_i)^2, \dots, \sum_{i=1}^d (S_{i,n} - C_i)^2)$


- Server holds database  $S$ , client holds query  $C$
- Used in biometric matching (face-recognition, fingerprint, ...)




# Example for Mixed-Protocol SFE: Minimum Euclidean Distance

Minimum Euclidean Distance:  $\min(\sum_{i=1}^d (S_{i,1} - C_i)^2, \dots, \sum_{i=1}^d (S_{i,n} - C_i)^2)$

- Server holds database  $S$ , client holds query  $C$
- Used in biometric matching (face-recognition, fingerprint, ...)



- A** Arithmetic sharing:  $v = a + b \bmod 2^\ell$ 
  - Free addition / cheap multiplication
  - Good for multiplication
- B** Boolean sharing:  $v = a \oplus b$  [GMW87]
  - Free XOR / one message per AND
  - Good for multiplexing
- Y** Yao's garbled circuits:  $S: k_0, k_1; C: k_v$  [Yao86]
  - Free XOR / no interaction per AND
  - Good for comparison




<i>Multiplication (32-bit)</i>		
<i>Protocol</i>	<i>Yao</i>	<i>Mixed</i>
<i>LAN [<math>\mu</math>s]</i>	1.1	0.1
<i>Comm. [KB]</i>	100	5

[DSZ15] D. Demmler, T. Schneider, M. Zohner: ABY – A Framework for Efficient Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-party Computation. In *NDSS'15*.

# The ABY Framework [DSZ15]

C++-Framework for efficient hybrid SFE


- Efficient secure two-party computation protocols & conversions using symmetric crypto
- Code: <https://encrypto.de/code/ABY>



[DSZ15] D. Demmler, T. Schneider, M. Zohner: ABY – A Framework for Efficient Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-party Computation. In *NDSS'15*.

## Compilation from HDL into SFE and efficient building blocks


- Function description in Verilog/VHDL (or via high-level synthesis in C)
- Extends TinyGarble by hardware synthesis for depth-optimized circuits:  
[SHSSK15] E. Songhori, S. Hussain, A.-R. Sadeghi, T. Schneider, F. Koushanfar:  
TinyGarble: Highly Compressed and Scalable Sequential Garbled Circuits. In *S&P'15*.



[DDKSSZ15] D. Demmler, G. Dessouky, F. Koushanfar, A.-R. Sadeghi, T. Schneider, S. Zeitouni. Automated Synthesis of Optimized Circuits for Secure Computation. In *CCS'15*.

Fully automated compilation from C into hybrid SFE

- Extension of CBMC-GC and combination with ABY: [HFKV12] A. Holzer, M. Franz, S. Katzenbeisser, H. Veith: Secure Two-party Computations in ANSI C. In CCS'12.
- Automated partitioning and protocol selection



[BDKKS18] N. Büscher, D. Demmler, S. Katzenbeisser, D. Kretzmer, T. Schneider.  
HyCC: Compilation of Hybrid Protocols for Practical Secure Computation. In CCS'18.

# HyCC – Hybrid MPC Applications

## Protocol online runtime: Biometric Matching (n=1000)

	Runtime LAN	Runtime WAN
Yao GC (Y)	1,177 ms	1,789 ms
GMW (B)	2,932 ms	7,974 ms
LSS and GMW (A+B)	131 ms	4,249 ms
<b>LSS and Yao GC (A+Y)</b>	<b>70 ms</b>	<b>584 ms</b>

## Protocol online runtime: Textbook Gauss Solver (n=10)

	Runtime LAN	Runtime WAN	Total Communication
Y	429 ms	<b>631 ms</b>	31 MB
A + Y	<b>256 ms</b>	4,235 ms	<b>10 MB</b>

## Protocol online runtime: MiniONN CNN (Relu, MNIST dataset)

	Runtime LAN	Runtime WAN
[LJLA17]	5,740 ms	-
A + Y	<b>1,621 ms</b>	5,882 ms


All circuits compiled with HyCC and evaluated in the ABY framework.

LAN: 1Gbit / WAN: 100Mbit and 100ms RTT.




1. Secure Function Evaluation with Mixed Protocols
- 2. Private Function Evaluation of Boolean Circuits**


# Secure Function Evaluation of Boolean Circuits



# Private Function Evaluation (PFE)



# Private Function Evaluation of Boolean Circuits





Solvency verification



Smart metering



Private databases



Insurance rate & credit  
risk assessment


# Challenges – Hiding the Circuit

- **Public:**

- Number of inputs  $u$
- Number of outputs  $v$
- Number of gates  $k$



- **Private:**

- Functionality of gates
- Topology of circuit



# Universal Circuit (UC)

There exists a Boolean circuit  $UC$  of size  $\Theta(n \log n)$  s.t.  
for any Boolean function  $f$  of size  $n$   
 $UC$  can be programmed to compute  $f$ .




Leslie G. Valiant  
1976

# Universal Circuit (UC)

There exists a Boolean circuit  $UC$  of size  $\Theta(n \log n)$  s.t.  
for any Boolean function  $f$  of size  $n$   
there exists a programming  $p$   
such that for any input  $x$ :  $UC(p, x) = f(x)$ .




Leslie G. Valiant  
1976




$$UC(p, x) = f(x)$$



# PFE of Boolean Circuits



# PFE of Boolean Circuits via SFE of a UC



# Further Applications of UCs beyond PFE



Obfuscation




Attribute-based Encryption



Batch Execution MPC



Adaptively Secure MPC



# Existing UC Constructions



	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way
Size	$5n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$
Depth	$3n$	$3.75n$
Code	✘	✘


[Val76] L. G. Valiant: Universal Circuits (Preliminary Report). In *STOC'76*.

# Valiant's UC Construction


$n$

$C$  size  $\leq n$


↓  
Graph  $G_C$



# Valiant's UC Construction




# Valiant's UC Construction







# Valiant's UC Construction




# Valiant's UC Construction



# 2-way Recursive UG Construction



# 2-way Recursive UG Construction




# A „Small,, Example

$u = 25$

$f$


$k = 56$

$v = 1$



$UC$

835 nodes /  
869 AND gates



# Existing UC Constructions



	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way	[KS08]
Size	$5n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$	$1.5n \log^2 n + 2n \log n$
Depth	$3n$	$3.75n$	$n \log n$
Code	✘	✘	✔

[KS08] V. Kolesnikov, T. Schneider: A Practical Universal Circuit Construction and Secure Evaluation of Private Functions. In *FC'08*.

# Existing UC Constructions




	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way	[KS08]
Size	$5n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$	$1.5n \log^2 n + 2n \log n$
Depth	$3n$	$3.75n$	$n \log n$
Code	✓	✗	✓

[KS16] Á. Kiss, T. Schneider: Valiant's Universal Circuit is Practical. In *EUROCRYPT'16*.


[LMS16] H. Lipmaa, P. Mohassel, S. Sadeghian: Valiant's Universal Circuit: Improvements, Implementation, and Applications. In *ePrint 2016/017*.

# Comparison






# Existing UC Constructions




	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way	[KS08]
Size	$5n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$	$1.5n \log^2 n + 2n \log n$
Depth	$3n$	$3.75n$	$n \log n$
Code	✓	✓	✓

[GKS17] D. Günther, Á. Kiss, T. Schneider: More Efficient Universal Circuit Constructions. In *ASIACRYPT'17*.


# 2-way Recursive UG Construction [Val76]



# 4-way Recursive UG Construction [Val76]




# 4-way Modular Embedding Algorithm



**Task 1:**  
Block  
embedding


**Task 2:**  
Recursion point  
embedding

## Blue: Improvement of 4-way UC over 2-way UC



$$\text{Maximum: } \frac{5}{4.75} - 100\% = 5.3\%$$

# Existing UC Constructions



	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way	[KS08]	[GKS17] Hybrid(2,4)
<b>Size</b>	$5n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$	$1.5n \log^2 n + 2n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$
<b>Depth</b>	$3n$	$3.75n$	$n \log n$	$3.75n$
<b>Code</b>	✓	✓	✓	✗

[GKS17] D. Günther, Á. Kiss, T. Schneider: More Efficient Universal Circuit Constructions. In *ASIACRYPT'17*.

UC for size  $n$


4-way split      ?      2-way split  
                         <>

⇒ At each recursion step: choose smallest construction

# Concrete Size of UCs – Hybrid UC

Green: Improvement of hybrid UC over 2-way UC


Blue: Improvement of 4-way UC over 2-way UC



$$\text{Maximum: } \frac{5}{4.75} - 100\% = 5.3\%$$




# Existing UC Constructions



	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way	[KS08]	[GKS17] Hybrid(2, 4)
<b>Size</b>	$5n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$ $4.5n \log n$	$1.5n \log^2 n$ $+ 2n \log n$	$4.75n \log n$ $4.5n \log n$
<b>Depth</b>	$3n$	$3.75n$ $3.5n$	$n \log n$	$3.75n$ $3.5n$
<b>Code</b>	✓	✗	✓	✗

[ZYZL18] S. Zhao, Y. Yu, J. Zhang and H. Liu: Valiant's Universal Circuits Revisited: An Overall Improvement and a Lower Bound. In *ePrint 2018/943*; to appear in *ASIACRYPT'19*.

# Improved Block [ZYZL18]



[ZYZL18] S. Zhao, Y. Yu, J. Zhang and H. Liu: Valiant's Universal Circuits Revisited: An Overall Improvement and a Lower Bound. In *ePrint 2018/943*; to appear in ASIACRYPT'19.


# Concrete Size of UCs – Improvement of [ZYZL18]

**Red:** Improvement of hybrid UC with [ZYZL18] 4-way UC over 2-way UC

**Yellow:** Improvement of [ZYZL18] 4-way UC over 2-way UC

**Green:** Improvement of hybrid UC over 2-way UC


**Blue:** Improvement of 4-way UC over 2-way UC



$$\text{Maximum: } \frac{5}{4.5} - 100\% = 11.1\%$$

$$\text{Maximum: } \frac{5}{4.75} - 100\% = 5.3\%$$

# Existing UC Constructions





	[Val76] 2-way	[Val76] 4-way	[KS08]	[GKS17] Hybrid(2, 4)
<b>Size</b>	$5n \log n$	<del><math>4.75n \log n</math></del> $4.5n \log n$	$1.5n \log^2 n$ $+ 2n \log n$	<del><math>4.75n \log n</math></del> $4.5n \log n$
<b>Depth</b>	$3n$	<del><math>3.75n</math></del> $3.5n$	$n \log n$	<del><math>3.75n</math></del> $3.5n$
<b>Code</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓

**+ Scalability**

[AGKS17] M. Y. Alhassan, D. Günther, Á. Kiss, T. Schneider: Efficient and Scalable Universal Circuits. In *ePrint 2019/348*; in submission.


# Scalable 4-way UC Implementation



[MNPS04]  
 $C_0 \leftarrow \dots f$  SHDL

[MNPS04] D. Malkhi, N. Nisan, B. Pinkas, Y. Sella. Fairplay-Secure Two-Party Computation System.  
In *USENIX Security'04*.

$$C \text{ size} \leq n \xleftarrow{\dots} C_0 \xleftarrow{\dots} f \quad [\text{KS16}]$$




[KS16] Á. Kiss, T. Schneider: Valiant's Universal Circuit is Practical. In *EUROCRYPT'16*.


$C$  size  $\leq n$




Graph  $G_C$











Code: <https://encrypto.de/code/UC>

# Experimental Results – UC Compiler (one-time expense)




# Implementation of PFE via UC




[DSZ15] D. Demmler, T. Schneider, M. Zohner. ABY – A Framework for Efficient Mixed-protocol Secure Two-party Computation. In *NDSS'15*.

# Runtime and Communication for PFE of Boolean Circuits



LAN: 10 Gbps, 1ms RTT  
WAN: 100Mbps, 100ms RTT




# Conclusions for PFE of Boolean Circuits

- Universal Circuits are a competitive solution for PFE of Boolean Circuits
  - UC size has reached lower bound of  $4.5n \log n$  AND gates for circuits of size  $n$  gates
- Performance of UC-based PFE (using Yao's GC in ABY):
  - AES ( $n = 38\,518$ ): 2s in LAN; 11s in WAN
  - $n = 1\,000\,000$ : 1.3 min in LAN; 5.9 mins in WAN
- Extending secure computation frameworks for PFE with UCs is simple
  - Simple adapter for UC format (similar to Fairplay's SHDL)
  - Code at <https://encrypto.de/code/UC>

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Thanks for  
your attention!

Questions?



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Contact:

<https://encrypto.de>